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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HILL v. COLORADO AND THE EVOLVING RIGHTS OF THE
UNWILLING LISTENER

I. INTRODUCTION
The right to free speech may be “[r]epeated so often in our jurisprudence
that we know it by rote,”1 but even so, there are many occasions for imprecise
application of the rights of speakers. One particular occasion for conflict is
when this fundamental right conflicts with some other right, such as the “right
to be left alone” that has been recognized in American jurisprudence.2 This
right to be left alone, also characterized as a right or interest of unwilling
listeners to be free from speech, has been the subject of many Supreme Court
cases in the past century. There have been many attempts to reconcile these
cases, either by the nature of the speech, the geographical location of the
speaker or other methods, but no method is adequate to synthesize all of the
opinions on the topic.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue when it decided Hill v. Colorado,3
and in doing so validated a Colorado state statute that created a protective
bubble around health care facilities, within which persons were prohibited
from approaching closer than eight feet to engage in certain speech without
consent of the listener.4 The Court analyzed the statute under the principles of
Ward v. Rock Against Racism5 and found the restriction content neutral. It was
merely a permissible restriction upon the manner of certain speech narrowly
tailored to serve the important state interest in protecting persons from
unwanted speech and assuring their access to health care facilities.
This Casenote will examine Hill within the context of the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, with a particular focus on those cases involving the
right of listeners to be free from unwanted speech. The scope of the “right” or

1. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Colo. 1999).
2. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000) (reasoning that “[t]he unwilling
listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our
cases. It is an aspect of the broader ‘right to be let alone’ that one of our wisest Justices
characterized as ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”)
(citations omitted).
3. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
4. Id. at 2499.
5. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
1281
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“interest” to be left alone will be examined, and a critical analysis of both the
Hill opinion and the “right to be left alone” will be offered.
II. HILL V. COLORADO
In 1993, concerned with protecting access to health care facilities in the
state, the Colorado Legislature enacted § 18-8-122 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, which provides:
(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care facilities for the
purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the
citizens of this state; that the exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel
against certain medical procedures must be balanced against another person’s
right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner;
and that preventing the willful obstruction of a person’s access to medical
counseling and treatment at a health care facility is a matter of statewide
concern. The general assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact
legislation that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another person’s
entry to or exit from a health care facility.
(2) A person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person knowingly
obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or exit
from a health care facility.
(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk
area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health
care facility. Any person who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3
misdemeanor.
(4) For the purposes of this section, “health care facility” means any entity that
is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to administer
medical treatment in this state.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a statutory or home
rule city or county or city and county from adopting a law for the control of
access to health care facilities that is no less restrictive than the provisions of
this section.
(6) In addition to, and not in lieu of, the penalties set forth in this section, a
person who violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to civil
liability, as provided in section 13-21-106.7, C.R.S.6

After passage of the Act, several abortion protesters filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the statute was facially invalid because it violated

6. COLO. REV. STAT., § 18-9-122 (1994 Cum. Supp.).
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the First Amendment.7 Plaintiffs alleged that the statute was a content-based
restriction on their freedom of speech, and that the statute was impermissibly
overbroad because it infringed on more speech than necessary in order to
accomplish its stated goal.8 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
state.9 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed10 and the Colorado Supreme
Court denied review, whereby plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court.11 While the writ was pending, the Court decided
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y.,12 which involved a similar
factual matter as the Colorado statute.13 Accordingly, the Court vacated the
decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration in light of
Schenk. On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed. The Colorado
Supreme Court then granted certiorari and upheld the statute.14
The Colorado Supreme Court viewed the case as involving two conflicting
rights: the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and “an individual’s right to
privacy, here represented by access to medical counseling and treatment.”15
The Court reasoned that the right of privacy, first recognized by Justice
Brandeis in 1890, was a “fundamental right,” such that “the First Amendment
can accommodate reasonable government action intended to effectuate the free
exercise” of the right.16 Although the case had been remanded for
determination in light of Schenk, the Court determined that Schenk did not
apply, and instead applied the test developed in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,17 reasoning that § 18-9-122(3) was “a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction and hence, does not violate the proscriptions of the First
Amendment.”18
1.

Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an opinion dated June 28,
2000, affirmed by a 6-3 majority.19 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion, and
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that was

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. App. 1995).
Id. at 673.
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 (2000).
Lakewood, 911 P.2d at 670.
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2487.
519 U.S. 357 (1997).
Id.
Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1246 (Colo. 1999).
Id. at 1253.
Id.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1253-54.
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2499 (2000).
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joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate dissenting
opinion.
The majority framed the question similarly to the Supreme Court of
Colorado: “whether the First Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by
the protection the statute provides for the unwilling listener.”20 The Court
determined that the First Amendment rights of the petitioners were not violated
because under the principles developed in Ward, the restriction was a contentneutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech.21
Before turning to the merits of the statute, the majority closely examined
the two competing interests at stake: on the one hand, the interest the state
sought to serve in protecting the rights of unwilling listeners, and on the other
hand, the constitutionally protected rights of law abiding speakers.22
Justice Stevens noted four basic principles underlying the case of the
challengers of the statute. First, the statute was alleged to be overbroad,
because it applied to all public rights of way within 100 feet of the entrance to
a health care facility, even though the legislative history clearly indicated a
motivation to chiefly protect access to abortion clinics.23 Second, the speech
and speech-related conduct of the petitioners was protected by the First
Amendment, even if offensive to some listeners.24 Third, the public sidewalks
involved were “quintessential public forums.”25 Finally, while it was arguable
to what extent, it was agreed that the statute would serve to lessen the
communicative impact of petitioners’ activities.26
Balanced against these First Amendment rights and principles, the Court
examined the state interests intended to be served by the statute.27 The main
interest cited was the police power to protect the health and safety of its
citizens, including the unimpeded access to health care facilities.28 In addition,
the Court noted that the interest analysis must take into account the fact that
the Colorado statute only dealt with speech directed at an unwilling audience.29
The Court noted that restrictions on First Amendment rights could be
appropriate where the speech was so intrusive as to be unavoidable (the captive
audience problem), or where there was a deliberate verbal or visual assault (the

20. Id. at 2485. The Court also subsequently framed the question as “whether the Colorado
statute reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding
speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners . . . .” Id. at 2488.
21. Id. at 2491.
22. Id. at 2488.
23. Id.
24. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
25. Id. at 2489.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2489.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

HILL v. COLORADO

1285

nuisance problem). The Court recognized that the privacy interest varied
widely with the context and factual setting of the dispute, and examined
several of the cases mentioned previously here, ultimately citing Rowan for the
proposition that “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling
recipient.”30
In response to criticism from the dissent that the Court was creating a right
to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum, Justice Stevens argued that “[w]e,
of course, are not addressing whether there is such a ‘right.’ Rather, we are
merely noting that our cases have repeatedly recognized the interests of
unwilling listeners in situations where ‘the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.”31
2.

The Dissenting Opinion

There were two dissenting opinions in Hill, with Justice Scalia writing an
opinion joined by Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy writing separately, “to
reinforce Justice Scalia’s correct First Amendment conclusions and to set forth
my own views.”32 Both dissenting opinions agreed on several issues: that the
Colorado statute was content based, that the statute was overbroad and that
there was no constitutionally cognizable interest in protecting citizens from
unwelcome speech.
(a) Just What Is the State Interest?
Justice Scalia’s most compelling argument was that the majority dropped
the ball regarding the necessary state interest.33 First, the Court analyzed the
statute with the state’s interest being the protection of “its citizens’ rights to be
let alone from unwanted speech.”34 However, the text of the Colorado statute
identified the State’s interest as ensuring that “the State’s citizens may ‘obtain
medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner’ by ‘preventing
the willful obstruction of a person’s access to medical counseling and
treatment at a health care facility.’”35 Justice Scalia saw the disconnect
between the asserted interest and the interest used by the Court as a purposeful
“distortion of our First Amendment law” designed to “sustain this restriction
upon the free speech of abortion opponents.”36
Further, Justice Scalia reasoned that the statute fails under either proffered
interest. Justice Scalia’s argument ran thus: if the state interest involved was

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 2490 (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2490.
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. (quoting COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999)).
Id. at 2509.
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“the right to be left alone,” then the statute failed because this interest is not
sufficiently valid to sustain a restriction on speech.37 On the other hand, if the
state interest was in preserving the “unimpeded access to health care facilities,”
then the statute was overbroad, since section (2) of the statute prohibited any
conduct that would result in impeding access to health clinics.38 There was no
reason, in Justice Scalia’s eyes, that any speech need be burdened if the interest
involved is unimpeded access.39
(b) Versace, or Omar the Tentmaker?
Justice Kennedy’s dissent added to the vagueness and overbreadth
arguments Justice Scalia raised.40 Like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy started
from the perspective that the statute was constitutionally infirm because it
attempted to limit speech that protested abortion.41 Beyond that threshold
matter, the Justices’ main point of contention with the majority diverged
somewhat. Rather than viewing the majority opinion as “caught on the
‘compelling state interest’ fence,” as Justice Scalia did, Justice Kennedy saw
the problem as being rooted in the overbreadth and vagueness area. The
statute would obviously be content-based if it were directed only at speech that
protested abortion. The attempt to save the statute by applying it to all speech
made it broader than necessary to advance the state interest.42 In addition,
Justice Kennedy argued that the specific conduct prohibited under the statute
was too vague to be enforceable (because, presumably, a statute that was more
precise would be an unenforceable prior restraint).43
This is not to say that Justice Scalia did not protest the lack of narrow
tailoring. He in fact agreed with Justice Kennedy on this point, arguing
colorfully that “if . . . forbidding peaceful, nonthreatening, but uninvited
speech from a distance closer than eight feet is a ‘narrowly tailored’ means of
preventing the obstruction of entrance to medical facilities . . . narrow tailoring
must refer not to the standards of Versace, but to those of Omar the
37. Id. at 2508.
38. Id.at 2510.
39. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2510.
40. Id. at 2517.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 2522 (reasoning that
[o]ur precedents do not permit content censoring to be cured by taking even more
protected speech within a statute’s reach. The statute before us, as construed by the
majority, would do just that. If it indeed proscribes ‘oral protest, education, or
counseling’ on all subjects across the board, it by definition becomes ‘substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.’).
43. Id. at 2520 (“In the context of a law imposing criminal penalties for pure speech,
‘protest’ is an imprecise word; ‘counseling’ is an imprecise word; ‘education’ is an imprecise
word. No custom, tradition, or legal authority gives these terms the specificity required to sustain
a criminal prohibition on speech.”).
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tentmaker.”44 The fundamental difference between the two is that while
Justice Scalia saw the problem as a statute where the state interest was either
non-existent or able to be accomplished by less restrictive means, Justice
Kennedy saw a statute that covered either too little or too much.
(c) Fundamental Fairness
Finally, the basic fairness of the statute concerned both dissenters. Justice
Kennedy summed up his misgivings when he stated, “[t]o say that one citizen
can approach another to ask the time or the weather forecast or the directions
to Main Street but not to initiate discussion on one of the most basic moral and
political issues in all of contemporary discourse, a question touching profound
ideas in philosophy and theology, is an astonishing view of the First
Amendment.”45 Justice Scalia similarly argued that under the Court’s
decision, “‘[u]ninhibited, robust, and wide open debate’ is replaced by the
power of the state to protect an unheard-of ‘right to be let alone’ on the public
streets.”46
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When determining the scope of the so-called “right to be left alone,” the
Court has typically framed the case as a clash between “the First Amendment
rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling
viewers or auditors . . . .”47 Since the conflict may involve all types of
communication and content, categorizing the body of law for analytic purposes
is difficult. Therefore, this Casenote considers the cases chronologically to the
extent possible. This chronological framework is subdivided by topical
analysis where there are several cases surrounding one topic of debate.48
A.

Early Cases: Sound Amplification

In an early examination of the conflict between free speech and the right to
avoid it, the Court ruled that a city could permissibly regulate the use of sound
amplification trucks.49 Kovacs v. Cooper involved an appeal from an
44. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2507.
45. Id. at 2517.
46. Id. at 2515.
47. Erzoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975).
48. For instance, cases involving “captive audiences” and the U.S. mail defy strict
chronological categorization and are therefore treated together. For a more thoroughly topical
approach to the problem, see Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be
Spoken To?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153 (1972). Haiman divides unwanted communication into the
areas of Door-to-Door Solicitation, Residential Picketing, Unwanted Telephone Calls and Mail,
Public Address Systems and Sound Trucks, and Billboards and Other Public Thrusting. Id. at
158-74.
49. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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individual who broadcast music and his voice over a loudspeaker in violation
of a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance.50 The court noted, “[t]he unwilling
listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street
but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically
helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud speakers except
through the protection of the municipality.”51
In a similar case involving sound amplification trucks just one year earlier,
the opposite outcome was obtained. In Saia v. New York,52 the challenged
statute forbid the operation of amplification devices without a permit granted at
the discretion of the Chief of Police.53 Recognizing that “[a]nnoyance at ideas
can be cloaked in annoyance at sound,” the Court struck down the statute.54
Since the grounds for striking down the statute involved the discretionary
nature of the permit procedure and the consequential potential for abuse, Saia
is factually different from Hill.55 Saia, however, does discuss one of the
fundamental conflicts at issue in Hill—the need to balance community interests
(peace and quiet in Saia; the interests of unwilling listeners in Hill) with First
Amendment rights. Saia established that when striking such a balance, courts
“should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred
position.”56
The principles developed in these two early cases established the ground
rules which were used in many of the later cases involving unwilling listeners.
First, in a commonly repeated refrain, the Court in Kovacs treated the captive
audience as sui generis, to which a greater level of protection (in the form of
regulation restricting speech) is available.57 In addition, the Court recognized
that where First Amendment rights come into conflict with some other right of
the community, some sort of balance must be struck, with the First
Amendment in the preferred position.58

50. Id. at 78.
51. Id. at 86-87.
52. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 562.
55. The Court reasoned that “[w]hen a city allows an official to ban [loudspeakers] in his
uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free communication of ideas” and
that any abuses loudspeakers may create could be addressed by narrowly tailored statutes. Id.
56. Id. at 562.
57. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86-87.
58. The Court in Hill v. Colorado reasoned that the relevant question was “whether the
Colorado statute reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected rights of
law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners.” 120 S. Ct. at 2488.
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Captive Audiences: Lehman and Pollack

Two subsequent cases further developed the “captive audience” concept
exemplified in Kovacs. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights59 the Court confronted
the issue of whether a city, through a management agreement with its public
transportation contractor, could prohibit political advertising on public buses.60
Lehman also reiterates the balancing principle found in Saia, reasoning that
“the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained
important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment
to the speech in question.”61 The conflicting interests in Lehman dictated that
the regulation was valid, mainly based upon the city’s role as a commercial
actor. As the Court noted, the decision to refuse political ads for placement on
city buses in Lehman “is little different from deciding to impose a 10-, 25-, or
35-cent fare, or from changing schedules or the location of bus stops.”62 Even
though this was the chief rationale for the Court’s ruling, the Court noted that
the public forum analysis was not appropriate because “‘[t]he streetcar
audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of
choice.’”63
Public Utilities Comm. of D.C. v. Pollack64 concerned the constitutionality
of broadcasting radio programs on the buses of a public utility transit
company.65 Petitioners alleged that the broadcasting violated their right to
privacy. In holding that the broadcast music did not violate the Constitution,
the Court reasoned that “[h]owever complete [the] right of privacy may be at
home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its possessor
travels on a public thoroughfare . . . .”66
The Pollack Court recognized that the Kovacs opinion did, in fact, protect
the interest of unwilling listeners as against amplified speech in public
places.67 The Court distinguished Kovacs, first by characterizing the holding
as concerning “amplified raucous sounds”68 and then by reasoning that Kovacs
“did not indicate that it would violate constitutional rights of privacy or due
process for the city to authorize some use of sound trucks and amplifiers in
public places.”69

59. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 302-03 (plurality opinion of Blackmun).
62. Id. at 304 (quoting Public Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 465 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 302.
64. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 464.
67. Id. at 464 n.10.
68. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
69. Pollack, 343 U.S. at 464 n.10.
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The Court’s rationale in Pollack, however, is more concerned with
questions of balance than with the captive audience problem. The large
majority of listeners riding the Capital Transit buses in Washington D.C.
wanted to hear music or at least did not object to hearing the music.70 The
Court was simply unwilling to allow a small minority of users to affect the
listening preferences of the majority of the public.71
Both Lehman and Pollack, therefore, advanced the principles brought
about in the earlier cases. The major advance in the area of the “captive
listener” problem is that persons can be “captive” even when in public.72 This
is important because the Court could just as easily have said that inherent in
the choice to use public transportation is an acceptance of listening to any
speech offered in the public forum. The fact that an individual could be
captive even in public is a concept that underlies the majority opinion in Hill
and is even explicitly recognized when the Court quotes the captive audience
language from Lehman.73
C. “Vulgar” Messages
Cohen v. California74 involved an individual who wore a jacket on which
he had written a profane anti-draft message into a courthouse.75 Upon
conviction for breach of the peace, the individual appealed. The Court
reversed, and in the course of rejecting an unwilling listener argument,
reasoned that “[t]he ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon
a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner.”76 The Court contrasted the situation in Cohen, where an
unwilling auditor might merely avert their gaze, with the situation where

70. Two studies conducted by the Public Utility Commission found that
93.4 per cent were not opposed; that is, 76.3 were in favor, 13.9 said they didn’t care, and
3.2 said they didn’t know; 6.6 per cent were not in favor, but when asked the question
“Well, even though you don’t care for such programs personally, would you object if the
majority of passengers wanted busses and streetcars equipped with radio receivers,” 3.6
said they would not object or oppose the majority will. Thus, a balance of 3 per cent of
those interviewed were firmly opposed to the use of radios in transit vehicles.
Id. at 459-60.
71. Id. at 465.
72. This principle was raised in the dissent in Pollack and was adopted in the majority
opinion in Lehman. See Lehman, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (“‘The streetcar audience is a captive
audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.’”) (quoting Pollack, 343 U.S. at 465
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
73. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2490.
74. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 21.
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listeners are subject to the “raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside
their residences.”77
Two interesting points may be made about Cohen. First, there is an
implicit rejection of the concept that vulgar speech can inherently constitute a
breach of the peace. While the Court might have taken the stance that the
words on the jacket constituted a per se breach of the peace criminally (or a
common law nuisance civilly), the Court instead focused on the empirical
effects of the speech itself.78 Rather than allowing the state to assert that some
persons might have been unwilling, the Court instead reasoned that “a more
particularized and compelling reason” must be given in order to restrict
speech.79
Second, the Court seems to endorse a theory of a continuum of privacy
interests in public spaces. The Court noted that “while it may be that one has a
more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking
through a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central
Park, surely it is nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted
expression in the confines of one’s own home.”80
Several years after Cohen, the Court found another occasion to evaluate
the conflict between vulgar speech and unwilling listeners. In this instance, the
opinion in Pollack notwithstanding, the Court determined that one unwilling
listener could affect a restriction on speech. In FCC v. Pacifica Found.,81 a
New York radio station was reprimanded for broadcasting comedian George
Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” monologue.82 Several weeks after the
broadcast, the FCC received what was apparently the sole complaint regarding
the broadcast.83 The radio station appealed both the FCC’s determination that
the material was indecent, and challenged the FCC’s ability to restrict its
speech. The Supreme Court was unsympathetic, holding both that the material
was indecent and the FCC could constitutionally regulate this speech.
Notably in Pacifica, the FCC specifically proposed that a nuisance-type
analysis be used.84 The Court accepted this view, but never analyzed whether,
77. Id.
78. Id. at 23 (“We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are
standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations
like that uttered by Cohen.”).
79. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
80. Id. at 21-22.
81. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
82. Id. Rather than imposing formal sanctions, the FCC issued a memorandum opinion
stating that the finding that the Carlin monologue was indecent would be “associated with the
station’s license file, and in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission
will then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by
Congress.” Id. at 730. The radio station appealed from this order. Id. at 733.
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id. at 731.
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or to what extent, the notion of public nuisance applied to restrictions on
speech where there were unwilling listeners. The only guidance the Court
offered was a short paragraph explaining the “pig in the parlor” concept of
nuisance and reasoning that “when the Commission finds that a pig has entered
the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that
the pig is obscene.”85
The outcome obtained in Pacifica differs from that obtained in both Cohen
and Pollack—two prior cases that bear factual similarities. Like Cohen, the
speech involved in Pacifica was vulgar. In Cohen, however, the fit between
the regulation challenged (breach of the peace) and the alleged offense
(wearing a vulgar jacket) was poor. The Court was simply unwilling to find
that a profane expression written on a jacket could constitute a breach of the
peace.86 In contrast, the Court determined that the vulgar monologue in
Pacifica fell squarely within the regulatory power of the FCC, and that the
exercise of the regulation was within acceptable bounds.87
In contrast, it is factual differences, rather than legal ones, that explain the
different outcomes in Pacifica and Pollack. Like Pollack, Pacifica involved
radio broadcasts with a small number of unwilling listeners. However, unlike
Pollack, the speech at issue in Pacifica was vulgar. Therefore, Pollack may be
characterized as determining whether any speech may be permitted in the
applicable public forum (public buses), whereas Pacifica hinged more
specifically upon whether “indecent” or “vulgar” speech may be publicly
broadcast with immunity from regulation.
While it is an important case, Erzoznik v. Jacksonville88 is difficult to
reconcile with the other opinions. In Erzoznik, a drive-in theater owner was
convicted for violating a Jacksonville ordinance that prohibited the showing of
nudity at drive-in theaters.89 The ordinance was struck down by the Court
upon a challenge of facial validity by the theater owner.90 In holding that the
statute impermissibly infringed upon the owner’s First Amendment rights, the
Court reasoned that, similar to Cohen, persons who did not wish to see the
85. Id. at 750-51.
86. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (“It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized
and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter
expletive a criminal offense.”).
87. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (reasoning that “of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although
other speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official
discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides
that such an action would serve ‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’”) (citations
omitted).
88. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 217-18.
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movie could merely avert their eyes. The Court seemed to take the Cohen
decision one step further, however, reasoning that even where the captive
audience problem is present, First Amendment rights should trump the
interests of unwilling listeners:
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society,
constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are
inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’ Much that we encounter
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless,
the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, absent the narrow circumstances
described above, the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.91

In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, took
issue with the fact that this “speech” could be avoided merely by not looking.
The unique character of the drive-in theater, including the fact that it
dominated the skyline and presented color and animation against a dark
background made the persons around the theater unable to avoid the speech.92
If it is true that where there is a captive audience, the Court has seen fit to
limit speech rights, the converse is also accurate: where there is no captive
audience problem, the Court is much less likely to let stand a restriction on
speech, even where speech is vulgar. Such was the case in Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,93 where a “dial-a-porn” company
facially challenged amendments to the Communications Act that prohibited
indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. The federal
attorneys relied on Pacifica for the proposition that indecent material may be
federally regulated.94 The Court disagreed, distinguishing Pacifica because it
did not involve a blanket prohibition on all indecent speech, as did the
regulation in Sable.95 In addition, the Court noted that there was no captive
audience problem because the phone services offered by Sable required the
affirmative act of dialing the number.96
The Sable decision is consistent with a nuisance analogy, in that it leaves
open the possibility that certain speech may be “channeled” via regulation to
appropriate times or places. To the extent that the statute at issue involved not
a channeling, but an outright ban, it was constitutionally infirm.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 210-11 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 220.
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
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D. Mail Cases
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept.97 is an example of a case that
squarely dealt with the balance between free speech and privacy. In Rowan,
several mailing companies challenged a federal statute that gave individuals
the right to require the removal of their names from junk mailing lists that
mailed sexually explicit material to the home.98 The Court reasoned that “the
right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the scales with the
right of others to communicate”99 and concluded that in this case, the statute
was permissible. The two related issues that swayed the Court in Rowan were
the “captive audience problem” and the unique nature of the home. In fact, the
Court addressed both issues when it stated that “[i]n today’s complex society
we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient
measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every householder to
exercise control over unwanted mail.”100
The prevention of unwanted mailings or advertisements arose again in
several subsequent cases. In Carey v. Population Services International,101 the
Court concluded that a ban on advertisements of prophylactics was
unconstitutional.102 In attempting to sustain its statute, the State of New York
argued that the ads were potentially “offensive and embarrassing to those
exposed to them” without offering any specific evidence of persons who were
offended, embarrassed, or otherwise were unwilling viewers.103 The Court
noted that the mere possibility of offense was insufficient to justify suppression
of speech.104 Further, the Court reasoned that “much advertising is ‘tasteless
and excessive,’ and no doubt offends many.”105
Similarly, in Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Product Corp.,106 the Court struck
down a statute that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for
prophylactics. 107 While Rowan involved the granting of power to an
97. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
98. The statute in Rowan specifically provided a procedure for removal from mailing lists
where the material being sent was a “‘matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to
be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.” Id. at 730 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964
ed., Supp. IV)).
99. Id. at 735.
100. Id. at 736.
101. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 701.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 701 n.27 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
106. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
107. Id. For a good discussion of the various interests involved in the unwilling listener area,
see the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, in Bolger, 463
U.S. at 77-78.
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individual to prevent unwanted mail, the Court subsequently declined to allow
the government itself to decide what unsolicited material may be sent to the
home. The Court recognized that under Rowan an individual had the power to
prevent mailings that the individual considered offensive, but that the statute
acted as an ex ante determination that all prophylactic advertisements were
objectionable enough to prevent their entry into the home was unwarranted and
unsustainable.108
Finally, in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,109 the Court struck down a regulation that prohibited
the inclusion of partisan advertising in Consolidated Edison electric bills.
Notably, the Court reasoned that the recipients of the bills were not a captive
audience, despite the language to the contrary in Rowan.110 The Consolidated
Edison opinion also interestingly offered the following uncited rule of law,
which is not seen in any prior or subsequent case: “[w]here a single speaker
communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the
government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’ audience cannot
avoid objectional speech.”111
E.

Acts on Public Property

United States v. Kokinda112 involved the ability of the Postal Service to
limit speech on its property.113 While Kokinda hinged on the question of
whether the Postal Service sidewalk was a “public area,” the case is relevant
since it upheld a restriction on peaceful speech in a public area that was not a
“public forum.”114 The respondents in Kokinda were convicted of violating a
federal regulation against soliciting alms and contributions on Post Office
property. In determining whether the regulation was permissible under a
reasonable test, the Court took into account the interests of unwilling listeners,
reasoning that “[a]s residents of metropolitan areas know from daily
experience, confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts passage and is
more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out

108. The Court noted that “we have never held that the government itself can shut off the
flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended.” Id. at 72.
109. 447 U.S. 530.
110. Compare Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 539 n.7 (“[t]he Consolidated Edison customers
who receive bill inserts are not a captive audience”), with Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 (“[i]n today’s
complex society we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient
measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every householder to exercise control
over unwanted mail”). While the bills themselves in Consol. Edison were not “unwanted,” the
bill inserts arguably may have been.
111. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 541-42.
112. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 737.
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information.”115 This intrusion helped to justify the ban, even though as in
Hill, there was no evidence that the specific persons challenging the Act had
“harassed, threatened, or physically detained unwilling listeners.”116 At least
tangentially, Kokinda engaged in a nuisance analysis whereby the improper
behavior of certain speakers was imputed to all members of the speaking class.
In addition to nuisance considerations, the ease of regulation appeared to
play a part in Kokinda. The Court noted that “postal facility managers were
distracted from their primary jobs by the need to expend considerable time and
energy fielding competing demands for space and administering a program of
permits and approvals.”117 Rather than being strictly about free speech on
public property, Kokinda is best read as upholding the ability of the United
States, as land owner and business operator, to efficiently manage its
operations.
In one of the most significant recent First Amendment cases, the Court
dealt with the unwilling listener problem tangentially. In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,118 a New York city regulation required users of a public
bandshell in Central Park to utilize sound-amplification equipment and a sound
technician provided by the city.119 One of the justifications offered by the city
was that the serene character of the adjacent “Sheep Meadow” section of the
park needed to be protected.120
The unwilling listeners in Ward were represented by park users and
residents of areas adjacent to the park, who over a period of years complained
about the concerts performed at the bandshell by the Rock Against Racism
organization.121 In an attempt to reconcile the unwilling listeners and the Rock
Against Racism organization, the city instituted a bandshell user guideline that
required use of city equipment and the city technician.122 The Court ruled that
these regulations were proper time, place, or manner regulations that the city
could enact to further its goal of maintaining the serenity of Sheep Meadow as
well as the surrounding neighborhoods.123
The most important aspect of Ward is that it gives the Court a framework
to judge future cases. Indeed, Hill was decided under the principles of Ward,
and the Court ultimately concluded that the manner of speech was being
regulated, rather than the content of the speech itself.124 Therefore, in both

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 734.
Id. at 753.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 735.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 788 n.2.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 788 n.2.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
Hill v. Colorado, 120 U.S. 2480, 2494 (2000).
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instances, the regulations were permissible, because in both cases the
regulations also furthered a state interest (in Ward, maintaining serenity in the
surrounding areas, and in Hill ensuring access to health facilities).
F.

Picketing Cases

The exemption of certain forms of communication from regulations
restricting speech can also make the regulation unconstitutional. In Carey v.
Brown,125 for example, the Court struck down a statute that prohibited
residential picketing, but exempted labor picketing.126 Since labor picketing
thwarted the State’s interest in the same manner as any other type of picketing,
exempting only labor picketing meant that the statute was not content-neutral.
Likewise, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,127 the Court struck
down a similar ordinance that was aimed at preventing picketing at schools,
but exempted labor picketing.
Frisby v. Schultz128 also involved the permissible scope of limitations on
residential picketing. However, the Town Board in Brookfield, Wisconsin,
relying on the Court’s teaching in both Carey and Mosley, wrote its ordinance
so that it banned all such acts only in residential areas.129 While rejecting the
contention that streets in primarily residential areas should not be considered
public fora, the Court nevertheless upheld the statute because it was contentneutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left
open ample alternative channels of communication. The government interest
involved was the protection of residential privacy. The Court noted that
although individuals most often avoid speech they do not wish to hear, “the
home is different.”130 The Court noted that there was no problem, from a First
Amendment perspective, with regulating speech that was offensive to a captive
audience.131
While Carey and Mosley are important cases in the evolution of this area
of law, the Frisby decision is perhaps the most relevant to the Hill decision.
The majority opinion in Hill cites Frisby for support of much of the legal
principles involved in the case. For example, Frisby provided support for the
notion that regulation of offensive speech may be permissible where the

125. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
126. Id. at 462. The Court ruled that “under the guise of preserving residential privacy,
Illinois has flatly prohibited all nonlabor picketing even though it permits labor picketing that is
equally likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.”
127. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
128. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
129. The ordinance read: “‘It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or
about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.’” Id. at 477.
130. Id. at 484.
131. “The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive
when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.” Id. at 487.
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audience cannot avoid it. Also, the majority relied on Frisby for the
proposition that a statute does not become viewpoint based merely because its
enactment was “motivated by the conduct of the partisans on one side of a
debate.”132 Finally, the Court noted that the fact that much more speech was
burdened by the Frisby ordinance illustrates that the Colorado statute is
reasonable.133
G. Abortion Cases
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.134 involved the challenge of an
injunction issued by a Florida state court prohibiting abortion protesters from
engaging in a number of different activities around a particular abortion clinic.
Finding that a previous, less restrictive injunction had been ignored, and
therefore was insufficient to protect the State’s interest,135 the Florida district
court entered the new, more restrictive injunction at issue. The Court upheld
the portion of the injunction establishing a thirty-six foot speech-free zone
around the entrance of the clinic136 and upheld a limited noise provision,137 but
struck the other portions of the injunction.138
Madsen is important for several reasons. First, as in many of the previous
cases, the Court discussed the captive audience problem. It reasoned that, as in
Frisby, the audience of the communication was captive for all intents and
purposes, and that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the
psychological and physical well-being of the patients at the clinic.139 The
interest in protecting residential privacy, therefore, is extended by analogy to
medical privacy after Madsen.140
132. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2000).
The antipicketing ordinance upheld in Frisby v. Schultz . . . a decision in which both of
today’s dissenters joined, was obviously enacted in response to the activities of
antiabortion protesters who wanted to protest at the home of a particular doctor to
persuade him and others that they viewed his practice of performing abortions to be
murder. We nonetheless summarily concluded that the statute was content neutral.
Id. (citation omitted).
133. “The restriction interferes far less with a speaker’s ability to communicate than did the
total ban on picketing on the sidewalk outside a residence . . . .” Id. at 2497.
134. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
135. The asserted interest was “to protect the health, safety and rights of women in Brevard
and Seminole County, Florida and surrounding counties seeking access to [medical and
counseling] services.” Id. at 753 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 770.
137. Id. at 772.
138. Id. at 776.
139. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768 (paraphrasing the Florida Supreme Court) (“[W]hile
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the ‘captive’ resident,
targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the
physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.”) (citations omitted).
140. Id.
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In addition, the Madsen injunction contained a 300 foot “no-approach”
provision that attempted to prevent unconsented approach for speech
purposes.141 The court struck down the provision, reasoning that “it is
difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches of persons
seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may
be, without burdening more speech than necessary . . . .”142 The Court noted
that while certain speech may be independently proscribable, there was no
showing that such speech was present.143 Finally, the Court noted that the
consent requirement, in and of itself, was a sufficient basis to strike the
injunction, because it burdened more speech than necessary.144
Schenck vs. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y.145 also touched upon
many of the same issues later argued in Hill.146 Schenck involved a fixed
buffer zone that was designed, similarly to Madsen, to protect patients’ access
to clinics. The injunction at issue in Schenck, however, went one step further
by enacting a fifteen-foot “floating” buffer that followed each of the clinic
patients as they entered or exited the clinic.147 Quoting extensively from
Madsen, the Court struck down the floating buffer zone as overbroad.148 Since
the asserted state interest was in protecting access to clinics, a buffer zone that
prevented approaching clinic patrons was broader than necessary. This was
particularly true because of the type of speech that could be affected
(leafleting) and the forum that was involved (public sidewalks, which the
Court called a “prototypical public forum”).149
After Madsen and Schenck, the Court apparently saw no problem with
fixed speech-free zones to remedy past abuses, but did not favor the operation
of floating buffer zones. In addition, both Madsen and Schenck recognize that
while First Amendment interests are paramount, specific allegations of past

141. The no-approach provision (section (5) of the injunction), prohibited the protestors “[a]t
all times on all days, in an area within [300] feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any
person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by
approaching or by inquiring of the [petitioners] . . . .” Id. at 760.
142. Id. at 774.
143. Id.
144. “The ‘consent’ requirement alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech than
is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic.” Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 774.
145. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
146. Id.
147. The temporary restraining order prohibited protesters from “physically blockading the
clinics, physically abusing or tortiously harassing anyone entering or leaving the clinics, and
‘demonstrating within 15 feet of any person’ entering or leaving the clinics.” Id. at 364.
148. See id. at 372-73.
149. The Court stated that “[l]eafleting and commenting on matters of public concern are
classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is
at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public forum.”
Id. at 377.
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illegal activities or disruptive behavior may justify some restrictions upon
speech.150 Further, the Court, at least in Madsen, recognized that the captive
nature of the audience may also justify regulation.151
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Why Hill is a “Hard Case”

The cynical (and simplistic) view of Hill is that it was simply another case
implicating abortion rights, and that the Court, in an outcome-determinative
manner, merely formed lines along either pole of the political spectrum and
fought over the middle, deciding votes. However, the presence of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in the majority complicates this analysis. Whatever may be
said regarding the Chief Justice’s political bent, it can surely be stated that he
is not a member of the “‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that the Court has set in
motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the
way . . .” of abortion, as phrased by Justice Scalia.152
There are two main complicating factors in this case. First, the Colorado
statute, at its most restrictive, merely prevents a speaker from approaching
within eight feet without permission. Accordingly, the burden on speech is de
minimus. Second, while there is no doubt that First Amendment rights have
always been paramount, particularly in the public domain, they have never
been absolute; where speech (or speech conduct) represents “fighting words”
or obscenity or nuisance, speech can and has been constitutionally proscribed.
1.

How Much Speech is Burdened in Hill?

The oral arguments in Hill shed some light upon how the Court, and in
particular, Chief Justice Rehnquist, viewed the case. In the context of a
discussion of the differences between Hill and Schenk, the arguments turned
toward the issue of the distance of the “bubble” involved in the statute. Chief
Justice Rehnquist offered:
But the—but the distance must make some difference, Mr. Sekulow. Perhaps
the difference between 8 feet and 15 doesn’t, but if you got down to 3 feet, for
example, it doesn’t seem to me there’s any message you can’t communicate at
a distance of 3 feet. The—the distance requirement would impede you.153

150. See the discussion supra regarding Hill v. Colorado’s treatment of this issue.
151. One difference between Schenck and Madsen was that the Court did not find a captive
audience problem for the patients in the clinic involved in Schenck. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376
n.8.
152. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2503 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen
v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994)).
153. Oral Arguments, Hill v. Colorado, 2000 U.S. Trans LEXIS 14, 7.
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Later, when the attorney for the petitioners argued that what was involved was
speech in a public forum, Chief Justice Rehnquist replied:
But speech on a public forum, the traditional concept is, you know, there’s
somebody on a soapbox and a bunch of people gathered around them, not that
you’re one on one with someone an eighth of an inch away.154

Both of these short excerpts support the position that ultimately found its
way into the majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens—that the statute
burdened little speech because no speech was affected as long as it was made
beyond the distance of eight feet.155 Justice Stevens, and the five other justices
who joined the majority, simply did not see any burden in fact where the
regulation created an eight foot bubble and allowed all speech outside that
bubble.
In so reasoning, the Court placed too much emphasis on the cognitive
component of speech, while ignoring the emotive aspect. While speaking at a
distance of eight feet may well be sufficient to convey the cognitive conduct of
the desired message, it may be insufficient to communicate the emotive
function, which has been termed as “practically speaking . . . the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”156
Indeed, under the Court’s rationale, Congress could conceivably forbid the
Court from hearing oral arguments altogether, since such a restriction on the
Court would “not have any adverse impact on the readers’ ability to read” the
parties’ briefs.157 Of course, Hill involved an eight foot limit rather than a total
ban, but the crux of the matter is that there is a difference between the written
and spoken word, and there is a difference, however small, between a word
spoken at eight feet and a word spoken at closer proximity.
2.

Is This Genre of Speech Able to be Proscribed?

Viewed from the perspective of the Colorado legislature that enacted the
law, the protesters around the entrances to the medical facilities had
appropriated more than their fair share of the public right of way, however that
term may be loosely used. In deference to fundamental notions of fairness (not
to mention the real-world praxis involved in comparing First Amendment
rights vis-à-vis the rights of citizens to peacefully go about their business and
“enjoy” the public land), Colorado should be able to enact and enforce laws
designed to prevent a group from dominating the public discourse to such an

154. Id. at 10.
155. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2483 (“The 8-foot zone should not have any adverse
impact on the readers’ ability to read demonstrators’ signs. That distance can make it more
difficult for a speaker to be heard, but there is no limit on the number of speakers or the noise
level.”).
156. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
157. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2483.
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extent. Divorced of their speech component, the actions that led the Colorado
legislature to enact the law involved the same types of actions that would
normally be considered a nuisance.
The Restatement, Second, of Torts defines a public nuisance as
“unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”158 The
Restatement comments that public nuisance includes “interference with . . . the
public peace, as by loud and disturbing noises . . . .”159 The twist in Hill and
similar cases is that the loud and disturbing noises are generated in a speech or
speech related conduct. Therein lies the difficulty for the courts. In many of
the cases, where a public nuisance was present (when viewed without regard to
any possible free speech implications), the Court has upheld a regulation
against such acts.
For example, in Ward, a regulation against loud music was upheld.
Similarly, regulation of amplified sound trucks was permitted in Kovacs.
While Pacifica did not represent the classic example of “loud noise,” the courts
that dealt with it nevertheless viewed it with an eye towards a nuisance analogy
(reasoning that the same recording might be appropriate for airing on the
public airwaves in another context; for instance, at a later time when no
children would be listening).
A.

Cantwell

The implicit nuisance analogy can be found in Cantwell v. Connecticut.160
Jesse Cantwell was a Jehovah’s Witness who went door to door soliciting
contributions and handing out information regarding his religion. Upon
meeting two men on the street, he stopped them and asked if he could play
them a record on the portable phonograph he was carrying. Upon receiving
their permission, he proceeded to play the record “Enemies,” which generally
attacked “all organized religious systems as instruments of Satan and injurious
to man; it then single[d] out the Roman Catholic Church for strictures couched
in terms which naturally would offend not only a person of that persuasion, but
all others who respect the honestly held religious faith of their fellows.”161 The
two men, both Catholics, were highly offended.
The Court set aside the conviction, chiefly on grounds of the overbreadth
nature of the breach of the peace statute.162 The rationale offered by the Court,

158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B (1977).
159. Id., § 821B, cmt. b.
160. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
161. Id. at 309.
162. Id. at 311.
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we think that, in
the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as
constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioners’
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however, implicated the mutuality of the speech, as well as the lack of any sort
of nuisance conduct on the part of Cantwell. The Court found Cantwell to be
engaged “only in an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or
contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, however misguided others
may think him, conceived to be true religion.”163 In addition, the Court noted
that “[t]here is no showing that [Cantwell’s] deportment was noisy, truculent,
overbearing, or offensive” and that “the sound of the phonograph is not shown
to have disturbed residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have
impeded traffic.”164
Cantwell, like Cohen and Erzoznick, may merely show that a general
breach of the peace statute is simply insufficient to constitutionally restrict any
speech. In each of the three cases, the government responded to the “there
oughtta be a law” outcry from affronted citizens with an ex post attempt to
shoehorn the conduct into a general statute already on the books. As such, the
response of the state of Colorado was markedly different—its legislature
passed a law. In so doing, it did its best to carefully tailor the law to the
perceived problem.
B.

The “Bad Apple” Problem

In addition to the problem of definition, the cases reveal serious fairness
concerns. In several at least, the conduct of several bad actors comprising a
small subset of a larger class is used to justify restrictions on the speech of the
entire class. In Hill, for instance, there was no finding that the respondents had
harassed. Likewise in Kokinda, there was no evidence that the particular
solicitors there had bothered anyone. The Court in both cases, however,
imputed the problematic speech of other similarly situated speakers upon the
entire class of speakers.
To a certain extent, this will always be the case when a state uses its police
power to address a perceived problem; for instance, a state may regulate nude
dancing establishments, thereby impinging the speech-related conduct of the
dancers, because of the perceived harmful “secondary effects” of such
establishments, such as crime, prostitution, et cetera.165 Such a regulation
affects both the bad actors and the innocent persons the same.

communication . . . raised no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as
to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in question.
Id. at 311. Of course, rather than a general breach of the peace statute, the Court in Hill was
confronted with a statute that was carefully drafted to avoid the infirmities found here.
163. Id. at 310. The Court did not address the thornier question of whether the men, when
consenting to be played a record on a public street, became “willing listeners” to any
communication a victrola might produce (such as the anti-Catholic material here).
164. Id. at 309.
165. See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
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However, there seems to be an inherent potential for misuse of this
concept, particularly since many important topics also tend to be the most
controversial, thereby creating the greatest potential for conflict. For instance,
suppose the city of Seattle decided to restrict the free speech rights of
protesters at the next World Trade Organization Conference. Under the
rationale in Hill, so long as the legislature found a need to protect its citizens’
health and safety, the city could enact restrictions on speech such as those
found in the Colorado statute to protect persons who do not wish to hear the
speech of the protestors. This would result in a small band of bad actors
shutting down the speech of a much larger group of protesters who stayed
within the law.
An appropriate next question would be “so what?” What harm is there in
regulating the manner by which certain speech may be directed at unwilling
listeners? The answer is twofold. First, since there is no specific requirement
regarding an appropriate level of evidentiary findings that would support
restrictions, there is potential for a state to push the outer limits of restrictions
by merely asserting that a problem exists.166 Such a finding without factual
basis could result in adversely impacting the very free speech rights that the
First Amendment purports to guarantee—those of minority or unpopular
speakers.
The second problem, related to the first, is that the lack of an adequate rule
of law to be prospectively applied invites abuse. With no clear or even
cohesive theory to follow, the First Amendment ceases to guarantee anything
greater than the proposition that speech within the current judicial vogue is
protected speech. This is undoubtedly not the arrangement intended by the text
or the spirit of the First Amendment.167
C. What is the Scope of the “Right” or “Interest”?
Much of the confusion in the cases can be traced directly to the fact that no
case—Hill included—ever fully defined the scope of the “right” or “interest”
that is claimed to exist on behalf of the unwilling listener. In many instances,
the Court merely mentioned the existence of an “interest” and moved on.
However, the Court would do well to clarify the scope of the interest in order
to guide future conduct.
166. See Alan J. Howard, When Can the Moral Majority Rule?: The Real Dilemma at the
Core of the Nude Dancing Cases, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 897-907 (2000).
167. Justice Scalia had the same concerns in mind when he argued:
I have no doubt that this regulation would be deemed content-based in an instant if the
case before us involved antiwar protesters, or union members seeking to “educate” the
public about the reasons for their strike. “[I]t is,” we would say, “the content of the
speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt prohibition . . . .
But the jurisprudence of this Court has a way of changing when abortion is involved.”
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2000) (citations omitted).
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It is clear that there is no absolute right to be free from unwanted
communication, at least not applied to all speech in all locations, at all times.
This is obvious by the fact that there is no corresponding legal duty to obtain
consent from every potential listener. However, courts have at various times
treated the interest of listeners as privileges, which operate to negate the right
of persons to engage in free speech, or powers, which grant the auditor the
ability to change a legal relation.168
1.

Privileges and “No-Rights”

The relation between a speaker and a listener may be characterized as a
privilege interacting with a “no-right.” From the speaker’s perspective, there is
a privilege to speak in a public place. This privilege includes the ability to
protest, educate, or counsel. The corresponding entitlement on the part of the
public (or more particularly, that portion of the public within earshot or
eyesight of the protest, education, or counseling) is a “no-right.” This “noright” means that any listener or view of the message has no right to stop the
speaker from speaking.
Alternately, the legal relations may be framed from the point of view of the
unwilling listener. From the listener’s perspective, there is a privilege to be
free from certain types of speech in certain types of situations. This privilege
is particularly strong where the listener is “captive” and cannot escape the
speech. In such a situation, the Court effectively recognizes a privilege on the
part of the listener to be free from speech, which is balanced by a “no-right” on
the part of those desiring to speak.
The wiggle room analytically is the definition of “captive audience.”
Users of public transportation buses are considered a captive audience.169
Visitors to the Los Angeles County courthouse, however, are not.170 Persons
whose homes are subject to picketing which is targeted at the occupant of the
house are captive;171 persons whose homes happen to overlook a drive-in
movie theater playing movies containing nudity are not.172 While the
definition defines the outcome, unfortunately the definition defies easy
synthesis, and so the legal relations are not clearly resolved.

168. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 50-51 (1923).
169. See, e.g., the discussion of Pollack and Lehman supra note 68.
170. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (reasoning that “[t]hose in the Los
Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes”).
171. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (“One important aspect of residential
privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect individuals
simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear . . . the home is different.”) (citations omitted).
172. See Erzoznick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (“In short, the screen of a
drive-in theater is not ‘so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure to it.”) (citations omitted).
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In addition to those circumstances where there is no “captive audience
problem,” a listener may also have a privilege as against a speaker in certain
situations where the listener is not a captive. The two situations where such
privilege issues typically arise involve circumstances where the content of the
message being spoken involves some sort of vulgar or sexual theme,173 or
where the conduct of the speech itself constitutes a nuisance.174
The cases involving nuisance have all involved unwelcome noise. The
Court has determined that individuals are privileged against unwelcome noise.
This is true even where the listeners are not a “captive audience” to the noise.
As Justice Kennedy wrote in Ward:
[I]t can no longer be doubted that government “ha[s] a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.” This interest is perhaps at its
greatest when government seeks to protect “the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home” . . . but it is by no means limited to that context, for the
government may act to protect even such traditional public forums as city
streets and parks from excessive noise.175

2.

Right-Duty-Power

Rather than a case of conflicting privileges, the speaker/unwilling listener
situation could also be analyzed in terms of rights, duties, and powers. A
person protesting on a public sidewalk in front of an abortion clinic normally
has a First Amendment right to engage in protest speech. The corresponding
duty on the part of the general public would be not to prevent the exercise of
this right. By requiring the consent of the unwilling listener as a prerequisite to
speaking, the Hill statute effectively granted a person entering into the clinic a
power: they could consent to the speech, thereby leaving the speaker’s right to
speak in place, or they could refuse to consent, thereby destroying the
speaker’s right.
This change in the legal relation between the anti-abortion protester and
the public land is what marks the interest conveyed to the clinic patron as a
power, and not a privilege. The existence of a privilege would merely operate
to deprive the speakers right to speak, without changing the legal relation
between the speaker and the public land. The patron merely says to the
speaker: “you are free to speak, but not to me” as opposed to saying “you are
no longer free to speak on this particular piece of property.”

173. See, e.g., discussion of Pacifica supra.
174. See discussion of Kovacs and Ward supra. For a discussion of other circumstances
where courts have protected unwilling listeners from “nonspeech harms,” see Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Is There an Obligation to Listen?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 489, 507-12 (1999).
175. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
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Prior to Hill, the Court had only created such a right-duty-power regime in
situations involving speech directed at the home. For example, in Rowan, the
Court reasoned that:
In effect, Congress has erected a wall—or more accurately permits a citizen to
erect a wall—that no advertiser may penetrate without his acquiescence. The
continuing operative effect of a mailing ban once imposed presents no
constitutional obstacles; the citizen cannot be put to the burden of determining
on repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has altered its material so
as to make it acceptable. Nor should the householder have to risk that
offensive material come into the hands of his children before it can be
stopped.176

By permitting a person to erect a wall through which no speech may enter, the
Court upheld a statute that granted the citizen a right in the home to be free
from certain types of speech. The corresponding duty on the part of the
privilege operates to negate the right of the mailing company to engage in free
speech by sending mail to the home.
IV. CONCLUSION
When speech is being forced upon a “captive” audience or when the
speech is so intrusive as to constitute a nuisance, the law will operate to protect
the “unwilling listener.” However, like any abridgment of speech, this
protective power should be used as sparingly as possible. Hill may be seen as
an invitation by some legislatures to begin a process of creative drafting in
order to limit many types of disfavored speech merely by characterizing the
limit as protecting unwilling listeners. Since most protest speech falls upon the
ears of persons who are “unwilling listeners” to some extent or another, there
is a danger of abuse in the precedent set by Hill.
JAMES J. ZYCH*

176. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (emphasis added).
J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like to thank my family, and in
particular, my wife and my father, for helpful comments on early drafts of this Note.
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